- You type
ls. The tab seals it with keys only it and your laptop share. - The relay forwards it. It sees a destination key, a number and sealed bytes. Nothing else.
- Your laptop opens it. It checks the tab's grant against your log, then runs the command.
- The answer comes back. Sealed the same way. Change networks and the session carries on.
What you trust
- Your devices hold the keys. Each device makes its own key, and it never leaves. Your account is the signed list of which keys are yours. Our servers hold none of them, so they can't slip in a key of their own.
- The relay forwards sealed bytes. It sees which key a message is for, and when, and how much: never what. Each session uses X25519 and ML-KEM together, so traffic recorded today stays sealed against a future quantum computer. When the network allows, your devices talk directly.
- Revoking works everywhere. Revoke a lost phone from any device of yours. Each machine learns of it the next time another device of yours reaches it, and refuses the phone from then on. A machine that was offline learns late, so grants are short-lived.
Where it can break
We write down where each idea fails, because that's what you're trusting.
- A stolen laptop is a valid key until its revocation reaches the machine holding your data.
- The relay is where availability depends, and it sees who talks to whom, when and how much, though not what.
- A machine that is offline misses revocations, so grants are short-lived.
- Lose every device that can sign for your account and you lose the account. Add a second one early.
What it won't do
- Un-read. What someone already read, they keep. Revoking decides what happens next.
- Search on our servers. We can't index what we can't read. Search runs on your machines.
- Make a browser tab as safe as a laptop. Any script on a page can read that page's key, so a tab is your least trusted device and is granted the least.